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SPECULATIVE OVERPRICING IN ASSET MARKETS WITH
INFORMATION FLOWS
BY THOMAS R. PALFREY AND STEPHANIE W. WANG1
In this paper, we derive and experimentally test a theoretical model of speculation
in multiperiod asset markets with public information flows. The speculation arises from
the traders’ heterogeneous posteriors as they make different inferences from sequences
of public information. This leads to overpricing in the sense that price exceeds the
most optimistic belief about the real value of the asset. We find evidence of speculative
overpricing in both incomplete and complete markets, where the information flow is
a gradually revealed sequence of imperfect public signals about the state of the world.
We also find evidence of asymmetric price reaction to good news and bad news, another
feature of equilibrium price dynamics under our model. Markets with a relaxed short-
sale constraint exhibit less overpricing.
KEYWORDS: Asset pricing, heterogeneous beliefs, speculation, experimental fi-
nances.
1. INTRODUCTION
THIS PAPER STUDIES equilibrium pricing dynamics in a simple dynamic asset
market where traders have heterogeneous beliefs and face the short-sale con-
straint. We analyze a model that follows from a long line of theoretical research
initiated by Harrison and Kreps (1978; henceforth HK). That line of research
has had a major impact in the theoretical finance literature, so it is surprising
that there have been no attempts to directly observe one of the central impli-
cations of the theory, what we refer to as speculative overpricing. By speculative
overpricing, we refer to the phenomenon where the current price of an asset
exceeds the maximum amount any trader is willing to pay if he/she has to hold
the asset to maturity (overpricing). Traders are willing to “overpay” in equilib-
rium because they believe (correctly) that in equilibrium there is a chance that
another trader will value the asset more highly than they do at some future
date. The key insight of the seminal HK paper is that speculative overpricing
of a multiperiod asset can arise in equilibrium if there is a combination of the
short-sale constraint and divergent beliefs about the fundamentals determin-
ing the underlying value of the asset. We report the results of a laboratory study
that implements the main features of such asset markets. The transactions data
from these markets are then used to test the speculative overpricing hypothesis
as well as several other testable implications of the model.
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The model is by design a simple one, simple enough to study easily in the lab-
oratory using the standard multiple-unit open-book continuous double-auction
market. We assume a finite horizon, two equally likely states of the world, A
and B, and a single asset, a simple Arrow–Debreu security that yields a payoff
of 1 in state A and of 0 in state B. As with most of the literature following HK,
traders are assumed to be risk-neutral. In each time period, a new public infor-
mation signal arrives at the market that is observed by all traders. Signals are
binary and independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.), conditional on the
state. The source of belief heterogeneity is motivated by well-documented het-
erogeneity in how individuals update prior beliefs after receiving a signal that
is correlated with the state of the world.2 Specifically, some individuals over-
react to signals in the sense of updating their prior beliefs more sharply than
would a Bayesian, while other individuals under-react in the sense of updating
their prior beliefs more conservatively than would a Bayesian. If the traders
are drawn from a pool of over-reacters and under-reacters, then the posterior
beliefs of traders can differ even after observing the same sequence of public
signals.
Together, the short-sale constraint and heterogeneous beliefs result in higher
equilibrium prices than in the case where all traders are Bayesians who cor-
rectly perceive the informativeness of the signals (Bayesian pricing). There are
two separate forces that produce this overpricing. The first is simply belief het-
erogeneity: the highest valuation trader will be an over-reacter if there has
been more good than bad news, and will be an under-reacter if the sequence
of signals has more bad than good news. In either case, this highest valuation
exceeds the valuation based on the correct Bayesian posterior on state A. The
second source of overpricing is speculation. The equilibrium price will gener-
ally exceed the valuation of the most optimistic trader, because he/she believes
in the possibility of a future sequence of public signals that would lead some
other trader to be the most optimistic, at which point trade would occur and
the currently most optimistic trader would cash out at a profit. We call the
difference between the current equilibrium price and the maximum current
valuation the speculative premium. The speculative premium is positive as long
as it is still possible for the set of most optimistic traders to change at some
future date.3
Another implication of our model concerns the trajectory of prices: asym-
metric reaction to good and bad news. Because price responses are damp-
ened when the marginal traders are under-reacters and exaggerated when the
marginal traders are over-reacters, the difference between the price and 0.5
2Laboratory choice studies by economists and psychologists have consistently found a range
of violations of Bayes’s rule. For example, the study by El-Gamal and Grether (1995) classifies
subjects into categories analogous to over-reacters and under-reacters.
3One can think of the speculative premium as representing a fair-odds bet by the currently
most optimistic trader that he will profitably sell to a more optimistic trader at some later date.
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is generally greater when there are more signals communicating good news
versus bad news than when there is more bad news than good news.
To test the pricing predictions derived from our model, we run laboratory-
controlled asset markets where asset returns are contingent upon a binary state
of the world, and the information flows consist of a sequence of 10 informa-
tive public signals. In these markets, all traders are informed that the prior on
state A is 0.5 and are provided with the conditional distribution of public sig-
nals given the state of the world. In one information treatment, the signals are
highly informative, whereas signals are less informative in the other treatment.
We impose the short-sale constraint and endow our traders with adequate liq-
uidity, so liquidity constraints do not bind.
We find persistent and significant overpricing. That is, in both information
treatments, we find pricing of the assets that is above the baseline of Bayesian
updating to homogeneous posteriors. We also find that trading prices under-
react to bad news compared to the reaction to good news, as implied by the
model. We estimate a parametric model of the distribution of trader belief
types, which allows us to test for heterogeneity of beliefs and also to back out
estimates of the speculative premium. We find that the estimated speculative
premiums are generally positive in those periods where the theory predicts it.
To dig more deeply into the overpricing phenomenon and to identify the ex-
tent to which it depends on the short-sale constraint, we run two additional
variations on the simple one-market setup. In one variation, which we call the
complete markets treatment, we open a second, complementary Arrow–Debreu
security market that pays 1 in state B and 0 in state A. Traders are endowed
with both assets and trading occurs simultaneously in both markets. Thus, good
news for the A market is bad news for the B market, and vice versa. The choice
of this alternative treatment has a number of motivations. First, the existence
of overpricing is very easy to identify, because it is implied whenever the sum
of the prices in the two markets exceeds 1. Second, past asset pricing exper-
iments found that prices are sometimes distorted from rational expectations
equilibrium prices when markets are incomplete, and very close to the rational
expectations equilibrium when a complete set of Arrow–Debreu securities are
traded (Plott and Sunder (1988)). Thus it is conceivable that the overpricing we
observe in our baseline could have been due to market incompleteness. Third,
for the same reason it is easy for the experimenter to identify overpricing when
markets are complete, it is also easy for the traders to identify it. In particular,
if prices add to more than 1, arbitrage opportunities become transparent, since
any trader is able to sell one unit of each asset and make a sure profit, although
these arbitrage opportunities are still limited by the short-sale constraint. We
still find overpricing in these complete markets, which suggests that these kinds
of possible effects cannot explain our consistent finding of overpricing in the
baseline treatments.
This leaves the short-sale constraint as the most likely remaining explana-
tion for the speculative overpricing we observe in our data. From a theoretical
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standpoint, the short-sale constraint is an essential feature of the HK theory of
speculative overpricing, and therefore a natural question is whether the over-
pricing persists if traders can sell the asset short. For this reason, in our final
treatment, which we call the short-sales treatment, we continue to have both
assets, but now allow short sales by permitting traders to buy from the exper-
imenter unlimited units of a risk-free “bundled” asset, consisting of one unit
of the A asset and one unit of the B asset, for a price of 1. To keep trading
as simple a task as possible, we only allow market transactions in the A asset.
However, this means that if the price of the A asset is higher than a trader’s
valuation, that trader can buy a risk-free asset bundle and then sell the A unit
of the bundle (retaining the B unit), generating an expected profit. Thus, this
treatment relaxes the short-sale constraint, and indeed we observe traders buy-
ing the bundled asset and then unbundling it by selling the A asset portion; they
are effectively shorting in the A market. This turns out to have a large down-
ward effect on prices. We find lower prices in the short-sales treatment that are
significantly closer to the homogeneous-belief Bayesian pricing than in either
the baseline or the complete markets treatment.
Section 2 gives some background and discusses some of the related liter-
ature. The model and the theoretical results are presented in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 describes the experimental design and procedures. Results are presented
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes with a summary of findings and suggestions
for future work.
2. BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION OF RELATED LITERATURE
2.1. Asset Pricing Experiments
There are three relevant classes of asset pricing experiments that provide a
useful background and contrast with the experiment presented in this paper.
First, there are a number of published multiperiod asset experiments that were
designed to test rational expectations equilibrium with no uncertainty, where
the asset paid off certain dividends in each period and perfect foresight pricing
was easily calculated. These date back to the initial study by Forsythe, Palfrey,
and Plott (1982; henceforth FPP). There is a connection with this paper, in that
the pricing was determined by a very simple recursive calculation starting from
the last period, and equilibrium had the property that, in each period, the price
was determined by exactly one trader type who values the asset the highest.
Forsythe et al. made two key findings in that experiment, which have been
successfully replicated with a number of variations (Forsythe, Palfrey, and Plott
(1984), Friedman, Harrison, and Salmon (1984)). First, prices converged over
time toward the rational expectations prices. Second, prices always converged
from below; that is, prices never exceeded the rational expectations prices. No
speculative premium was ever observed. The current experiment differs from
these earlier experiments by introducing state uncertainty, sequential public
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information signals, and Arrow–Debreu securities that pay off only in the last
period.
A second class of asset pricing experiments, initiated by Plott and Sunder
(1982, 1988) and reviewed in Sunder (1995), explicitly focuses on the ques-
tions of whether and under what conditions state-contingent claims markets
successfully aggregate private information in static markets, that is, rational
expectations equilibrium in the sense of Radner (1979) and Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980). Traders are endowed with private information at time 0, the
market opens and clears at time 1, and, in theory, private information is fully
revealed by the equilibrium price as if it had been public information from the
start. Those experiments focus on questions about aggregation of private infor-
mation and the conditions under which transaction prices converge to the fully
revealing rational expectations equilibrium. One of their findings, which partly
motivated our complete markets treatment, is that pricing was more consistent
with the rational expectations theory when markets are complete, in the sense
of including a full set of Arrow–Debreu securities, than when markets are in-
complete as in our baseline treatments. More recent studies have dug deeper
into questions about why standard predictions about price response to infor-
mation (Asparouhova, Bossaerts, Eguia, and Zame (2009)) and the distribu-
tion of asset holdings (Bossaerts, Plott, and Zame (2007)) may fail. In contrast
to the present paper, these approaches are based on the standard capital asset
pricing model and explore the role of heterogeneity in attitudes toward risk
and ambiguity, while our approach centers around heterogeneous beliefs.
The third class of experiments are the “bubble experiments” initiated by
Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988). Like the first class, these are multi-
period asset markets where the assets generate a stream of dividends. The div-
idends in each period are i.i.d. draws from a known distribution. Thus, unlike
our model, realizations of the outcomes in each period provide no information
about the future value of the asset. Rather, the expected value of the asset is
known at all points in time, so there is no possibility for heterogeneous beliefs.
Since dividends accrue each period, the fundamental asset value declines over
time. Consequently, the equilibrium price dynamics for such markets are com-
pletely different from markets that share the properties of our model. In fact,
if all traders are risk-neutral, equilibrium prices simply decline linearly to zero
over time. If there are T periods remaining, the asset’s value is simply equal to
T times the expected per-period dividend of the asset.
Indeed, the observed price dynamics in these bubble experiments are com-
pletely different from the equilibrium price dynamics in our model. The pricing
more closely resembles the original FPP experiment. In early periods, transac-
tion prices are significantly below the equilibrium price, as if there is a negative
speculative premium. Because the equilibrium price declines over time while
the price adjustment process drives the below-equilibrium prices upward, the
transaction prices eventually catch up with equilibrium prices. When that hap-
pens, the price adjustment stops, and levels out. However, the equilibrium price
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continues to fall. This results in a situation where prices exceed fundamental
value—a bubble. The surprising observation in these experiments is that trans-
action prices often remain approximately constant for a while even though the
fundamental value is declining. Volume declines as well, and then the price col-
lapses to its fundamental value at or near the time the terminal period when
the asset expires. This is obviously not an equilibrium phenomenon, at least
within the class of models that motivated those experiments or the class of
models considered here. A second finding from those experiments that mirrors
the FPP class of experiments is that the disequilibrium pricing (both the under-
pricing in early periods and the overpricing in middle-to-later periods) diminishes
with experience, leading to convergence in the direction of the rational expec-
tations equilibrium. Also noteworthy is that equilibrium pricing in the basic
bubble experiment does not depend on factors such as short sales or liquidity
constraints, trader heterogeneity, complete markets, and so forth. In fact, re-
searchers have run many variations, including futures markets and other types
of market organization, which generally lead to similar conclusions. In one
variation particularly relevant to the present paper (Porter and Smith (2003)),
short sales are allowed, and the bubble phenomenon persists, and if anything
is even more pronounced.
2.2. Theories of Speculative Trade in Asset Markets
Models in the finance literature have analyzed the impact of speculative
trading due to heterogeneous beliefs on asset prices when no short sale is
allowed. Biais and Bossaerts (1998) considered several types of heterogene-
ity in beliefs, such as common knowledge about the belief formation rules
only, and derived the implied speculative value of the assets under each type.
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) found speculative bubbles with high volume and
volatility in their model of differences in beliefs due to overconfidence. Our
model is closest to the one studied in Harris and Raviv (1993), in which they
looked at heterogeneity of beliefs in a model with a continuum of public sig-
nals, but where some traders have market power so prices are not determined
competitively. Like Scheinkman and Xiong, they focused on the relationship
between trading volume and price volatility.
Morris (1996) built a dynamic version of the HK speculative trading model
to show that small differences in prior beliefs can lead to a significant specu-
lative premium. In the HK model, the heterogeneity of expectations regard-
ing others’ beliefs that drove the speculative buying in anticipation of reselling
was taken as given. Morris modeled this heterogeneity as initial differences
in beliefs regarding the fundamental value of the asset, so that, as beliefs con-
verge over time to the true probability, the speculative premium falls to zero as
well. He also formalized Miller’s (1977) claim that the most optimistic trader
would hold all the assets, assuming sufficient liquidity, and that the most op-
timistic valuation would drive the equilibrium pricing. Ottaviani and Sorensen
SPECULATIVE OVERPRICING IN ASSET MARKETS 1943
(2007) analyzed the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) price dynamics in
a binary prediction market where traders have heterogeneous priors and pri-
vate information. They found that the prices actually under-react to informa-
tion under the assumption that traders are liquidity-constrained or risk-averse.
They also found that more information provided over time corrects this ini-
tial under-reaction so that the price approaches the Bayesian posterior. Fi-
nally, Asparouhova et al. (2009) explored the implications of a different kind
of behavioral bias in beliefs by studying asset market equilibria with ambiguity-
averse traders.
Our model builds on these ideas about speculation and belief heterogene-
ity and maintains the institutional assumptions of sufficient liquidity, risk-
neutrality, and short-sale constraint. However, we depart from the assumption
of heterogeneous priors and updating about the probability of future dividends
based on the history of dividends, because ours is a model of an asset that pays
off only at the end of the market based on the state of the world. Instead,
traders in our model, who have a homogeneous prior, observe a sequence of
public signals over the life of the asset, but draw different inferences about the
state of the world from this information, which leads to heterogeneous poste-
rior beliefs.
3. THE MODEL
Nature chooses the state of the world,  ∈ {AB}, where the probability
of A is p ∈ (01). There is an asset market with T + 1 trading periods, t =
{012    T }, and I risk-neutral traders, i = {12     I}. There is one type
of asset in this market. Each unit a trader holds at the end of period T pays off
1 if A is the state of the world and 0 if the state of the world is B. There are
no intermediate direct returns from holding the asset in periods 0     T − 1.
Traders observe a sequence of public signals, s = {s1     sT }, where st denotes
the signal observed at the beginning of trading period t. There are two sources
of earnings in these markets: trading profits or losses from transactions made
during the market and the one-time state-dependent payoff for the final asset
holdings at the end of the market. Each trader is initially endowed with xi
units of this risky asset and yi units of a safe asset that pays 1 in both states
of the world (“cash”). We assume traders are risk-neutral, so if trader i’s final
allocation of the risky asset is xiT , and final allocation of cash is y
i
T , then i’s
utility is Ei = yiT + xiT IA, where IA = 1 in state A and IA = 0 in state B.
Signals are binary, with st ∈ {ab}, and are generated by a symmetric stochas-
tic process that is independent and identically distributed across periods, con-
ditional on the state.4 Conditional on  = A then st = a with probability
4Most of the theoretical results hold for more general signal structures. Assumptions such as
a binary signal space, independence, symmetry, and identical distributions over time are used for
simplicity of exposition and to keep the theoretical model as close as possible to the experimental
implementation.
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q > 05 and st = b with probability 1 − q. Conditional on  = B, st = b with
probability q > 05 and st = a with probability 1 − q. In the initial trading pe-
riod, traders have no information about the state of the world except the prior
p0. Since the asset pays off only in state A, we sometimes refer to the asset as
asset A and sometimes refer to a signal st = a as good news and a signal st = b
as bad news.
3.1. Equilibrium Prices With Bayesian Traders
First, suppose that all traders are Bayesians and use a common Bayesian
updating rule, based on the “true” stochastic process generating the signals.
That is, q is common knowledge and all traders update using Bayes’s rule. Let
ρt be the common belief that the state of the world is A, given the history of
signals {s1 s2     st}. Note that ρ0 = p because no information has yet been
revealed. Given ρt , the common posterior at t + 1 if st+1 = a is
ρ
st+1=a
t+1 =
qρt
qρt + (1 − q)(1 − ρt) (1)
and the common posterior at t + 1 if st = b is
ρ
st+1=b
t+1 =
(1 − q)ρt
(1 − q)ρt + q(1 − ρt) (2)
Given that the asset pays off 1 in state A and 0 in state B, and given that
all agents are symmetric and risk-neutral, this common posterior is also the
valuation of the asset. This is the Bayesian equilibrium price of the asset after
any history.
3.2. Equilibrium With Heterogeneous Beliefs
This section contains a theory of pricing in the asset A market if traders have
heterogeneous beliefs of a particular kind. As in the HK models, the traders
agree to disagree. At every point in time, each trader thinks his own belief is
absolutely correct. Traders have rational expectations about the distribution of
future prices, in the sense that they agree on the mapping from sequences of
signals to the equilibrium price, and disagree only about the fundamental value
of the asset.
The traders could have subjective priors and start out with different home-
grown prior beliefs pi0 that the state is A. However, since we state clearly to
the traders that states A and B are equally likely in the instructions, this type
of belief heterogeneity is unlikely.
We focus on a model where different traders have different perceptions
about the informativeness of each signal. In this case, traders start in period
0 with the common prior, p0, but each trader has his own personal estimate,
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qi, of the informativeness of the signal. These qi’s could differ from the objec-
tive q of the signal.
This subjective updating leads to heterogeneity in the degree to which dif-
ferent traders will update their belief about the state of the world in response
to identical sequences of signals. Specifically, it is possible that some traders
over-react to news, and other traders under-react to news (relative to how a
Bayesian with qi = q updates).5 Past experiments (e.g., Anderson and Sunder
(1995), Goeree, Palfrey, Rogers, and McKelvey (2007), El-Gamal and Grether
(1995)) have found evidence of this kind of judgment bias, including hetero-
geneity. Over-reaction to the signals is sometimes referred to as base-rate ne-
glect or a base-rate fallacy, and under-reaction is sometimes referred to as
conservatism (Camerer (2003)).
3.2.1. Trader Types With Subjective Updating Heterogeneity
Consider possible trader types characterized by the parameter θ ∈ [0∞].
A trader with type θi will treat a single signal as if it had the informational
equivalent of θ independent signals, each of informativeness q. Thus, θi mea-
sures how much trader i under-reacts (θi < 1) or over-reacts (θi > 1) to the
signal relative to q.
Let ρit denote trader i’s belief at the beginning of period t that the state of
the world is A given some history of public signals {s1 s2     st}. Since traders
share a common prior when no information has yet been revealed, pi0 = p for
all i ∈ I. Given ρit , trader i’s updated posterior that the state of the world is A
after observing st+1 = a, if i is type θi, equals
ρ
st+1=a
it+1 (θi)=
qθiρit
qθiρit + (1 − q)θi(1 − ρit) (3)
and after observing st+1 = b equals
ρ
st+1=b
it+1 (θi)=
(1 − q)θiρit
(1 − q)θiρit + qθi(1 − ρit) (4)
With this formulation of the trader types, posterior beliefs are always proper
probabilities in the sense that trader i’s updated posterior that the state of the
world is B after observing st+1 = a equals
1 − ρst+1=ait+1 (θi)=
(1 − q)θi(1 − ρit)
qθiρit + (1 − q)θi(1 − ρit) (5)
and after observing st+1 = b equals
1 − ρst+1=bit+1 (θi)=
qθi(1 − ρit)
(1 − q)θiρit + qθi(1 − ρit) (6)
5This also implies that traders differ in their expectations about future signals.
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We refer to traders with 0 ≤ θ < 1 as Skeptical types. At one extreme is the
θ = 0 type. Traders of this type believe that the signals are just noise, as if the
signal distribution were independent of the state. They do not update their
prior after either signal a or signal b. Such a type’s probabilistic belief that A is
the state of the world remains unchanged for any sequence of signals. That is,
ρ
st+1=a
it+1 (0)= p ∀t s1     st 
We refer to traders with θ = 1 as the Bayesian type. Traders of this type
believe they are receiving signals of strength q, so their posterior probabilities
are equivalent to those of a Bayesian:
ρ
st+1=a
it+1 (1)=
qρit
qρit + (1 − q)(1 − ρit) 
We refer to θ > 1 as Gullible types. Traders of this type update as if the
informativeness of signals is higher than q. For extremely high values of θ,
fickle traders treat a signal as nearly a full revelation of the state. For example,
if p = 05, q = 07, and θi = 10, then, after the first signal, if s1 = a, trader i’s
posterior is
ρ
s1=a
i1 (10)=
0710
0710 + 0310 = 09998
This does not imply that gullible types’ beliefs move immediately to 0 or 1
and stay there. In fact, exactly the opposite is the case. In the above example,
if s2 = b, then i’s beliefs go back to ρs1=as2=bi2 = 05, and then if s3 = b again,
the trader’s belief would be ρs1=as2=bs3=bi3 = 00002. Thus, gullible types have
relatively volatile beliefs, while skeptical types have relatively sticky beliefs.
3.2.2. Equilibrium Prices
We maintain the assumptions of no short sale (implemented in the experi-
mental design) and sufficient liquidity so that any trader can hold all units of
the risky asset for any price less than or equal to 1 Under these assumptions,
we can apply arguments similar to those used to solve the HK model and char-
acterize the equilibrium price dynamics in our model.
For the remainder of the paper, we will assume p= 05.6 For any fixed p, the
updating process depends only on q, the number of a signals, which we denote
by α, and the number of b signals, which we denote by β ≡ t − α. Hence, in
the baseline case of homogeneous Bayesian beliefs (θi = 1 ∀i), the equilibrium
6The model extends in a straightforward way to the more general case of p = 05.
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price of the asset at period t, PBt , following any history in which the number of
a signals is α, equals
PBt = ρt =
qα(1 − q)t−α
qα(1 − q)t−α + qt−α(1 − q)α 
Given the way we have defined our different trader types, a trader’s posterior
beliefs will depend only on the trader’s type, q, and the difference between the
number of good news signals and bad news signals, δ= α−β. Specifically, the
current belief of trader type θi can be expressed as
ραit(θi) =
qθiα(1 − q)θi(t−α)
qθiα(1 − q)θi(t−α) + qθi(t−α)(1 − q)θiα
= 1
1 +
(
1 − q
q
)θiδ 
Define ρt(α) = maxi∈I{ραit(θi)} to be the most optimistic belief among the
traders in period t about A being the state of the world, and define θ∗t =
arg maxi∈I{ραit(θi)}. That is, ρt(α) = ραit(θ∗t ). The equilibrium price of the asset
at period t given the number of a signals, Pt(α) must be equal to the highest
expected return of holding it to the next period. If the price is strictly lower
than the highest expected return, then the trader(s) with the highest expected
return would demand infinite units of the asset and the market would not clear.
On the other hand, if the price is strictly higher than the highest expected re-
turn, then the demand for the asset would be zero and that price cannot be the
equilibrium price.
Let ϕt(α) denote the most optimistic belief about the probability of an st+1 =
a after α a signals, up to period t. Then,
ϕt(α)= ρt(α)
(
qθ
∗
t
qθ
∗
t + (1 − q)θ∗t
)
+ (1 − ρt(α))
(
(1 − q)θ∗t
qθ
∗
t + (1 − q)θ∗t
)
(7)
Note that this is not equivalent to the most optimistic belief about A be-
ing the state of the world, because  = A does not necessarily mean st+1 = a.
Traders can update their beliefs and asset valuations based only on the se-
quence of revealed signals, so pricing depends upon the revealed signals and
the traders’ expectations about future signals. The θ type with the most opti-
mistic belief about the state of the world being A also has the most optimistic
belief about the next signal being a.7 Now we can specify the equilibrium price
Pt(α)= ϕt(α)Pt+1(α+ 1)+
(
1 −ϕt(α)
)
Pt+1(α)(8)
7This follows because θ∗t = mini∈I{θi} when ρt(α) < 05 and θ∗t = maxi∈I{θi} when ρt(α) > 05.
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The first term on the right hand side (RHS) is equal to the most optimistic
belief about an a signal being revealed next period multiplied by the price next
period if st+1 = a. The second term is equal to the corresponding belief that
a b signal will be revealed next period multiplied by the price next period if
st+1 = b. Equation (8) states that the asset price must be equal to the highest
expected return of holding the asset to the next period. If the price is lower
than that, then the trader who would get the highest expected return would
have infinite demand. If the price is higher than that, then no trader would
want to hold the asset.
In the last period, period T , the price is equal to the highest posterior belief
among all traders that the state is A:
PT(α)= ρT(α)(9)
The equilibrium pricing scheme is uniquely pinned down by equations (6)
and (7) because we can now solve backwards for the equilibrium price at ev-
ery period. Note that our model and this specification of the equilibrium price
dynamics depart from the original HK and Morris models in two specific ways.
First, while they look at a finite truncation of an infinite market, we analyze a
market with T <∞ periods. Because of our finite horizon, we can immediately
rule out other possible pricing trajectories involving bubbles or Ponzi schemes
that Harrison and Kreps and Morris consider. Second, while their model intro-
duces uncertainty as to whether the asset will pay a dividend after each period,
the asset that we analyze pays off only at the end of the market after T periods.
Thus, in their analysis, the price dynamics and speculative premiums are driven
by heterogeneous beliefs about dividend payoffs in future periods based on the
past dividend stream. In our analysis, the price dynamics and speculative pre-
miums are driven by heterogeneous updating of beliefs about the state of the
world that determines final asset payoff.
3.3. Speculative Premium
The above analysis shows that equilibrium prices in a market where traders
have heterogeneous beliefs will typically be different from equilibrium prices if
all traders are Bayesian (θ = 1). The difference between equilibrium prices in
our model and Bayesian pricing arises for two different reasons. At any point
in time, trader k’s willingness to pay for the asset has two separate compo-
nents: (a) a valuation component based on trader k’s current hold-to-maturity
valuation; and (b) a speculative premium component that exists if there is some
probability that trader k can resell the asset at some future date following a
sequence of public signals that leads another trader to have a higher hold-to-
maturity valuation than trader k.
Consider first how the valuation component affects prices when there are
heterogeneous beliefs, in the sense that traders with different θ’s will have dif-
ferent hold-to-maturity valuations of the asset. Trader k’s valuation in period
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t given α, ρkt(α), is simply his/her posterior belief that the state is A, which
depends on θk. Any trader k is willing to pay at least his hold-to-maturity val-
uation, ρkt(α), and therefore the equilibrium price must be at least equal to
ρt(α) = maxi∈I{ραit(θi)}. In states where α > β, ρt(α) = ραit(θmax), and in states
where α < β, ρt(α)= ραit(θmin). Therefore, if θ < 1 for some traders and θ > 1
for other traders, as choice experiments have indicated, then this implies that
equilibrium prices must exceed Bayesian prices, at least for all α = 0.8
Consider next how the speculative premium component, the difference
between the current equilibrium price and the current maximum hold-to-
maturity valuation among all traders, affects prices when there are heteroge-
neous beliefs. That is, we define the speculative premium by πt(α) = Pt(α) −
ρt(α). Following Morris (1996), we give two definitions of an optimistic trader
(i.e., a trader with the maximum hold-to-maturity valuation).
DEFINITION 1: Trader k is a current optimist at t if ρkt(α)= ρt(α)
DEFINITION 2: Trader k is a permanent optimist at t if ρkt′(α′) = ρt′(α′) for
all t ′ = t + 1    T and for all α′ = αα+ 1    α+ t ′ − t
In words, a permanent optimist at t not only has the (weakly) most opti-
mistic belief among all traders at t that A is the state of the world, but will
also continue to be an optimist for all possible sequences of future signals. The
speculative premium can be calculated recursively by
πt(α) ≡ ϕt(α)
[
πt+1(α+ 1)+ ρt+1(α+ 1)
]
+ (1 −ϕt(α))[πt+1(α)+ ρt+1(α)]− ρt(α)
It is straightforward to prove that πt(α)≥ 0 for all t = 0     T and for all α=
01     t. The following result shows that the speculative premium is strictly
positive if and only if there is no permanent optimist.
PROPOSITION 1: (i) If |δ|< T − t, then no trader is a permanent optimist and
Pt(α) > ρit(α) ∀i, and πt(α) > 0.
(ii) If |δ| ≥ T − t, then there is a permanent optimist, and πt(α)= 0.
See Appendix for the proof.
In our experimental setup, there are 10 signals released in each market, so
T = 10. In this case, the condition for a positive speculative premium stated
in part (i) of Proposition 1 simplifies to α < 5 and β < 5. With fewer than
five pieces each of both good and bad news, there is always the possibility of
enough additional pieces of either good or bad news before the end of the
8In our model, ρkt(α)= 05 for all traders if α= β.
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market such that the current optimist at period α+β= t will no longer be the
optimist. However, if α is greater than or equal to 5, this is no longer possible.
The θmax trader(s) is the permanent optimist because there will always be at
least as many pieces of good news as there are pieces of bad news, regardless
of future pieces of information. Similarly, if β is equal to or greater than 5,
then the θmin trader(s) is the permanent optimist. The permanent optimist(s)
will continue to hold the assets until the end of the market, so there is no
speculative premium once a permanent optimist exists.
3.4. Asymmetric Response to Good versus Bad News
We also compare by how much the price at time t differs from the flat prior
p = 05 when α pieces of good news have been revealed versus when t − α
pieces of good news have been revealed. An implication of our model is that
equilibrium prices react more to pieces of good news than pieces of bad news.
PROPOSITION 2: 1 − Pt(α) < Pt(t − α) ∀α> t2 .
See Appendix for the proof.
3.5. Horizon Effect
Next, we explore another pattern of the speculative premiums: the hori-
zon effect. As the number of periods until the end of the market decreases,
the speculative premium is nonincreasing. The first part of this horizon effect
follows directly from Proposition 1: if a sufficiently large number of good or
bad news signals have been revealed (|δ| ≥ T − t), then the speculative pre-
mium, πt(α), will equal zero for all subsequent periods. This is true because
with enough pieces of either good news or bad news, relative to the number
of periods remaining, there is no possibility that the most optimistic trader will
change, no matter how many pieces of good news or bad news follow.
The second part of the horizon effect is that, in periods where |δ|< T − t, the
speculative premium is nondecreasing in the horizon for fixed δ. With fewer
trading periods left in the market, the probability of δ switching between pos-
itive and negative also decreases; therefore, the speculative premium cannot
increase.
PROPOSITION 3: πt(α)≤ πt−2(α− 1) ∀T ≥ t > 1 and α< t.
See Appendix for the proof.
Note that since t = α + β, the value of δ is the same at histories (α t) and
(α − 1 t − 2). Thus, the proposition states that the speculative premium is
(weakly) higher in earlier periods, holding δ= α−β constant.
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4. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
We began our experimental analysis by conducting six sessions of a one-asset
trading market, which we refer to as the baseline sessions, with a total of 68
individual traders. The traders were registered Caltech students who were re-
cruited by email solicitation. Sessions were conducted at the Social Science Ex-
perimental Laboratory at Caltech. Instructions were read out loud and screen
displays were explained using a Powerpoint slide show in front of the labora-
tory at the beginning of each session. All interactions during the sessions took
place through the computer interface. The trading interface used the open
source software package Multistage Games.9
In each market of a session, a coin is flipped before the market opens to de-
termine the state of the world: either State A (heads) or State B (tails). The
result of the coin-flip is not announced until the market closes. We then or-
ganize and allow trading in a single-asset market, where each subject can take
trading positions as buyers and/or sellers.10 To ensure adequate liquidity, all
traders have a sufficiently large initial cash endowment. Traders are also en-
dowed with three units of the asset. No short selling is allowed. There is also a
bankruptcy constraint that does not allow any trader to engage in a transaction
if her cash holdings go below zero. Each trader receives payoffs at the end of
the market based on final asset holdings and cash holdings. All prices are in
integers values. In state A, each unit of the asset pays off 100 experimental
dollars at the end of the market; in State B, each unit of the asset pays off 0.11
There are eleven trading periods in each market, each period lasting for 50
seconds. Trading is opened for the first trading period, and follows an open
continuous double auction procedure. Subjects can type in bids to buy and/or
offers to sell as many units of the asset as they want, subject to the liquidity
and short-sale constraints. When a bid or offer is entered, it immediately shows
up on the public bid and offer book, which is displayed in the center of each
subject’s screen. Only improving bids and offers could be made, and only the
most recent current bid and offer are active. Subjects can accept a bid or offer
by highlighting it with the mouse and clicking the “accept” button, subject to
the bankruptcy and short-sales constraints. Subjects can also cancel an active
bid or offer they had previously posted. At the 50-second mark, all unfilled bids
and offers are cleared from the book, and the second 50-second trading period
begins.
At the start of the second trading period, the binary public signal (good
news or bad news) is drawn according to the distribution conditional on the
9http://multistage.ssel.caltech.edu/.
10Additional procedural details are available in the Supplemental Material (Palfrey and Wang
(2012)).
11In four of the baseline sessions, the state 2 payoffs equaled 20 instead of 0. In the analysis
of data, all transactions and prices are rescaled on a 0 to 100 scale. Experimental dollars were
converted to U.S. dollars using an exchange rate of either 0.01 or 0.02, depending on the session.
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original coin-flip and publicly announced to all subjects. Holdings are carried
over across periods. Trading occurs in the second period following the same
rules and procedures as in the first period. After 50 seconds, the book is again
cleared and a new public signal is drawn and announced. This continues for
11 trading periods (until 50 seconds after the 10th public signal has been an-
nounced). After the last trading period, the market closes, the state of the
world is revealed, and each trader’s cash on hand is credited based on final
holdings of the asset. We then proceed to open another market, with proce-
dures identical to the first market. The experimenter again flips a coin to de-
termine the state, trading screens are reset, asset endowments are reset at three
units for each trader, and cash holdings are carried over from the first market.
This continues until a total of six markets are conducted. Each subject is then
paid in private the sum of his or her earnings in all six markets, plus a show-up
fee of $10. Each session lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours, including instructions
and payment.
The public signal was generated by rolling a die in each period, as described
in the instructions (see Appendix). In three of the sessions, the signal distri-
bution corresponded to an informativeness of q = 59 , and in the other three
sessions, the signal informativeness was q = 69 . These conditional signal distri-
butions were explained carefully and accurately to the subjects.
Two additional sessions with 10 traders in each were conducted using a com-
plete market design. In these sessions, traders were allowed to buy and sell two
assets, one which paid off in state A and the other in state B. Hence, these
markets offered the opportunity for limited arbitrage, suggesting the hypoth-
esis that speculative overpricing will be diminished compared to the baseline
sessions. Traders were endowed with three units of each asset. In other re-
spects, they were conducted in an identical manner as the baseline sessions
described above.
To explore the effect of the short-sale constraint on asset prices directly, we
conducted three additional sessions where markets were organized to allow
traders to engage in short sales. Specifically, at any time the market was open,
any trader was allowed to purchase from the “bank” a safe, bundled asset con-
sisting of one unit of asset A and one unit of asset B at a risk-free price of 100.
Traders were allowed to purchase as many units of the safe, bundled asset as
they wished, subject to the cash-on-hand constraint.12 This allows any trader
who has zero asset A holdings to engage in a strategy that mimics short-selling
asset A, by purchasing the bundled asset and then unbundling it by selling off
the asset A part. All three sessions used the signal strength q = 59 and there
were six 11-period markets. The procedures were otherwise the same as the
one-asset market sessions: traders could hold units of both A and B assets, but
only the A market was open for trading. Table I provides a summary of the
experimental design.
12Traders could also resell the bundled asset back to the bank for a price of 100.
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF EXPERIMENTAL SESSIONS
Session Type Signal # Mkts # Traders Period (sec)
1 One asset 59 6 12 50
2 One asset 59 6 12 50
3 One asset 59 6 10 50
4 One asset 69 6 12 50
5 One asset 69 6 12 50
6 One asset 69 6 10 50
7 Complete 59 6 10 50
8 Complete 69 6 10 50
9 Short sale 59 6 11 50
10 Short sale 59 6 12 50
11 Short sale 59 6 12 50
5. RESULTS
We present the results of our experiment in the following order. First, we
analyze whether there is significant overpricing in the data from the baseline
sessions, and to what extent this can be attributed to a speculative premium.
We next test two related implications of the model: asymmetric reaction to
good news versus bad news, and the horizon effect. Third, we report results
from our two alternative market designs, which allow inframarginal traders,
who believe prices are too high relative to their beliefs, to engage in arbitrage
in ways that were not available in the baseline design. This includes completing
the market by opening up markets for state contingent claims in both states,
and explicitly allowing short sales. Finally, we examine the dynamics of individ-
ual asset ownership from period to period as information is gradually revealed,
and compare it to the theoretical predictions about ownership dynamics.
The hypotheses generated by the model concern the trajectory of transac-
tion prices in the markets. The central hypotheses concern overpricing relative
to the Bayesian benchmark, which, as we showed in Section 3, is driven by
two different phenomena: the valuation component, which derives from het-
erogeneous current hold-to-maturity valuations, and a speculative component,
which derives from heterogeneous future hold-to-maturity valuations. Because
we cannot control for, or directly observe, each individual trader’s θi, measur-
ing these two components of overpricing in our data means that the distribu-
tion of θi’s has to be estimated from the observed transaction prices. Before
proceeding with the estimation, we first ask simply whether, in our markets,
the combined effect of the two components produces prices that are in excess
of the prices that would arise if traders had homogeneous, Bayesian beliefs.
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We then turn to speculative overpricing by estimating the speculative pre-
mium. To do this, we estimate θmin and θmax for each session. We also obtain
estimates for a model of homogeneous beliefs by constraining θmin = θmax. This
allows us to conduct a nested test to see whether our data reject the null hy-
pothesis of homogeneous beliefs. This is done separately for each session. We
then use these session-by-session estimates to obtain a quantitative measure
of the implied speculative premium component of overpricing in every trading
period of every session, that is, the difference between the price and the valu-
ation of the most optimistic type. This provides a direct test for the existence
of a speculative premium in our data, as well as allowing us to test the model’s
specific theoretical predictions about how the speculative premium depends
on the history of public signals. We also provide some finer tests of the impli-
cations of the theoretical model based on heterogeneous beliefs.
5.1. Transaction Prices
5.1.1. Overpricing Relative to the Bayesian Benchmark
To begin our analysis, we compare asset prices to the Bayesian benchmark,
that is, the value of the asset assuming Bayesian updating (θ= 1). We calculate
the median price of all transactions in each trading period and use this as our
price observation for that trading period. For the analysis in this section of
the paper, we relate prices by the amount of information revealed. To do this,
we code the history of public signals that has been revealed up to period t by
counting the number, α, of good news signals and the number, β, of bad news
signals. The observations for our analysis are aggregated at the period level.
However, for ease of presentation in this section of the analysis, we construct
an aggregate price for all periods in all markets that share the same δ. That
is, we use the median of the median transaction prices over all trading periods
with the same value of δ. The δ = 0 trading periods are further broken down
into two categories, depending on whether it was the initial trading period of a
market (α= β= 0) or a later trading period (α= β> 0).
Signal Strength: q = 59 . Table II presents the aggregate median prices for the
q = 59 sessions, for each value of δ as well as the predicted prices for the homo-
geneous Bayesian updating model. N refers to the total number of transactions
that occurred at that value of δ.
Figure 1 plots the prices in the q = 59 sessions against the difference in good
versus bad news signals, along with the predicted prices under the null model
where all traders Bayesian update to the common posterior after receiving
each signal (i.e., no heterogeneity). The observed transaction prices remain
above the predicted ones regardless of the difference between good and bad
news signals. Furthermore, the observed and predicted prices under the null
model are significantly different from each other, according to the Wilcoxon
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TABLE II
MEDIAN PRICES BY INFORMATION REVEALED (q= 59 )
δ Median Price (N) Bayesian Price (θ= 1)
−6 375 (4) 208
−5 481 (4) 247
−4 512 (24) 291
−3 50 (52) 339
−2 525 (113) 39
−1 556 (182) 444
0 (initial period) 538 (136) 50
0 588 (148) 50
1 60 (138) 556
2 612 (58) 61
3 752 (24) 661
4 875 (35) 709
5 931 (7) 753
signed-rank test (p< 00001).13 This suggests that although the traders are re-
ceiving informative signals about the state of the world, they may be using non-
FIGURE 1.—Median prices versus Bayesian predictions (q= 59 ).
13The Wilcoxon test assumes independence across observations. To the extent that there is
some correlation across observations in our data, the p-values we report for these tests should be
treated as a lower bound. Alternative tests with lower power (e.g., binomial test) also yield highly
significant test statistics.
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Bayesian updating heuristics. To the extent that there is heterogeneity of these
heuristics, asset prices will deviate systematically from those predicted under
the assumption of perfect Bayesian updating and lead to overpricing according
to the multiple-θ model of speculation.
The homogeneous beliefs model predicts the price to be 50 in all periods
where there are equal pieces of good and bad news, δ= 0. A Wilcoxon signed-
rank test reveals that the median prices in these periods are significantly higher
than 50 (p< 00001). Next, we turn to the price in the initial period when there
have been no news announcements. Under the null model, the price in the ini-
tial period of each market should be 50, reflecting the flat prior. This predic-
tion does not hinge upon any assumptions about the belief updating process.
In fact, the median price is above 50 in all 18 initial periods (Wilcoxon signed-
rank: p = 00002). These transaction prices in the initial periods may offer
the clearest evidence of speculative trading. Since no information has been re-
vealed, if the prices are above 50, at least some traders must be trading based
on speculation about price changes in future periods.
Signal Strength: q = 69 . Table III and Figure 2 display the aggregate median
prices for the q = 69 sessions. We find that observed prices follow the trajectory
of predicted Bayesian prices more closely than in the q = 59 sessions. However,
the observed prices are still greater than the predicted prices for nearly all δ,
and these differences are significant according to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test
(p< 00001).
TABLE III
MEDIAN PRICES BY INFORMATION REVEALED (q= 69 )
δ Median Price (N) Bayesian Price (θ= 1)
−7 09 (6) 08
−6 22 (8) 15
−5 44 (2) 3
−4 102 (12) 59
−3 131 (30) 111
−2 219 (57) 20
−1 438 (80) 333
0 (initial period) 581 (110) 50
0 625 (98) 50
1 75 (146) 666
2 875 (88) 80
3 925 (53) 889
4 975 (39) 941
5 988 (5) 97
6 981 (8) 985
7 994 (2) 992
8 100 (1) 996
SPECULATIVE OVERPRICING IN ASSET MARKETS 1957
FIGURE 2.—Median prices versus Bayesian predictions (q= 69 ).
We again look at the median prices in all periods where δ= 0 and the prices
are predicted to be 50 under the null model with homogeneous Bayesian up-
dating, just as in the q = 59 treatment. Here again we find that the median prices
are also significantly higher than 50 (Wilcoxon signed-rank: p < 00001). The
median prices in the 18 initial periods are not as uniformly high as they were
in the q = 59 treatment. Nevertheless, they are still significantly higher than 50
(Wilcoxon signed-rank: p = 00120), with only four periods having a median
price lower than 50 and three more periods exactly at 50.
RESULT 1: Prices in the one-asset market are systematically higher in all
treatments than equilibrium prices based on the null model of correct homo-
geneous trader beliefs about q.14
5.1.2. Speculative Overpricing
In this section, we focus on a key implication of our model, speculative over-
pricing. We estimate θmin and θmax from the pricing data for each session, which
we then use to obtain quantitative measures of the speculative premium as a
function of the history of public signals. We test the implications of Proposi-
tions 1 and 3 on the estimated speculative premiums.
14The transaction prices are also inconsistent with a model of homogeneous but incorrect be-
liefs about q (i.e., homogeneous θ, but θ = 1). For the model with homogeneous θ < 1, prices are
predicted to be less than the null model when δ > 0; and for the model with homogeneous θ > 1,
prices are predicted to be less than the null model when δ < 0. Both predictions are rejected in
our data.
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Estimating the Distribution of θ-Types. We use our transaction price data
to estimate the maximum and minimum θ types15 for each session using the
following procedure. Using the recursive formulae in our model described in
Section 3, we can calculate the theoretical price trajectory given any pair of
values (θmin θmax) for every sequence of signals in our data. Depending on the
sequence of public signals, either the maximum θ type or the minimum θ type
will be the most optimistic traders, and this is what determines the asset price
trajectories in our model. Recall that θ = 0 corresponds to a trader who acts
as if signals contain no useful information about the state, and θ = 1 corre-
sponds to a trader who Bayesian updates with the correct q. We now com-
pute the equilibrium price trajectories for all pairs of θmin = 00102    and
θmax = 00102    such that θmin ≤ θmax. This produces a matrix of prices that
depends on α and β. Note that our estimation procedure also allows for the
constrained model of homogeneous beliefs where θmin = θmax. This implies a
nested test for heterogeneous beliefs. With homogeneous beliefs, there is no
speculative premium.
For each possible (θmin θmax) pair, we sum up the squared deviations of the
median price in each trading period of each market from the theoretical price
for that pair. Formally, let Pgmt be the median transacted price in trading period
t of market m of session g. Let αgmt and βgmt denote, respectively, the number
of a signals and b signals received up to and including period t in market m
of session g. Let P∗t (αgmtβgmt |θmin θmax) denote the equilibrium prices from
our theoretical model. Then we define the model error as the sum of squared
deviations of the price data in session g from the theoretical model, evaluated
at parameters (θmin θmax):
eg(θmin θmax)=
∑
mt
[
Pgmt − P∗t (αgmtβgmt |θmin θmax)
]2

The estimated parameters of the model for session g are given by
(
θ̂
g
min θ̂
g
max
)= arg min
0≤θmin≤θmax
{
eg(θmin θmax)
}

Both the observed and predicted price are normalized to [0, 1]. We also pooled
the sessions of each treatment together to estimate a treatment-level θ̂min and
θ̂max. The results are displayed in Table IV.16
15The theory does not depend on the distribution of types except for the minimum and the
maximum θ.
16In 12 out of 396 trading periods, there were no transactions. These are treated as missing
data.
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TABLE IV
TYPE ESTIMATION BY SESSIONa
Session q θ̂gmin θ̂
g
max θ̂
g
min = θ̂
g
max F-stat
1 5/9 0.2, 1.7 0.6 2361∗
2 5/9 0, 1 0.3 1231∗
3 5/9 0, 1.8 0.3 2273∗
Pooled 5/9 0, 1.5 0.5 4844∗
4 6/9 0.5, 1 0.9 466∗
5 6/9 1.1, 1.3 1.1 10
6 6/9 0, 1.5 0.8 131∗
Pooled 6/9 0.6, 1.3 0.9 786∗
a ∗ indicates homogeneous model (no speculative premium) rejected
(p< 005).
Column 3 of Table IV shows the estimated (θ̂gmin θ̂
g
max) pairs. Column 4 dis-
plays the best fitting homogeneous θ model. Column 5 contains the F -test
statistic for the null hypothesis θ̂gmin = θ̂gmax, where
F =
eg(θmin = θmax)− eg(θmin < θmax)
(n− 1)− (n− 2)
eg(θmin < θmax)
n− 2

and n is the number of trading periods. The fit is uniformly worse for the single
θ estimations compared to the θ pair ones, suggesting that our model with het-
erogeneous posterior beliefs among the traders better captures the observed
price dynamics. The homogeneous belief model is rejected at the 5% level for
all sessions except one. In the one exception, the price dynamics suggest that
most of the traders’ beliefs are close to the objective signal strength.
Some additional observations can be gleaned from the estimation results
for both the heterogeneous and homogeneous belief models. For the homoge-
neous belief model, θ̂imax = θ̂imin is less than 1 for five of the six sessions. If we
assumed that all traders updated their beliefs in the same way, then the price
trajectory would suggest that, on average, traders under-reacted to the infor-
mation flow. On the other hand, under the heterogeneous belief model, θ̂imax is
estimated to be at least 1 for all six sessions. Furthermore, θ̂imin and θ̂
i
max span a
considerable range for most of the sessions. Given the better fit of this model
for nearly all the sessions, the likely heterogeneity across traders, ranging from
those who react little to information to those who over-react, would have been
masked by a homogeneous belief model.17
17We would expect such variation within and across sessions if there is some underlying dis-
tribution of θi in the population and we are drawing small (10 or 12) independent samples of
traders from this distribution.
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RESULT 2—Heterogeneity: We estimate significant heterogeneity in updat-
ing rules across subjects in all sessions. The range varies across treatments, with
θ̂imax greater than or equal to 1.
To illustrate how the observed sequences of transacted prices compare to
the prices in the estimated model with heterogeneity, Figure 3 displays price
graphs of five asset markets from four different sessions. The markets were
chosen to illustrate a wide range of behaviors and a range of different es-
FIGURE 3.—Five sample markets from four sessions.
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timated θ’s. We include two markets from the same session to illustrate the
session-level model fit on markets with very different information flows. These
graphs present all the bids, offers, and transactions in each market, in addi-
tion to the price trajectory of our model estimates as well as of the best fitting
homogeneous θ for that session. Transacted prices appear as large dots in the
graph, unaccepted bids to buy appear as small dots, and unaccepted offers to
sell appear as small triangles. The estimated prices from our model appear as
solid lines and the estimate prices from the best fitting homogeneous θ model
appear as dashed lines.
Estimating the Speculative Premium. We use the session-specific θ̂gmin and
θ̂gmax to calculate the speculative premium for each period of each session.
Recall that the speculative premium is the difference between the price and
the maximum valuation of the asset among all traders, which is determined
by either the θmin or θmax trader, depending on the information revealed:
Pt(α)− ρt(α) For each period, we determine whether the θmin traders or the
θmax traders are the marginal ones. We then calculate the maximum valuation
of the asset by these marginal traders given their θ, and subtract that from the
period’s median asset price. This difference is the trading period’s speculative
premium. We then take the median of all speculative premiums in periods with
the same δ. Table V presents the median speculative premium as a function of
δ, the analogue to the price Tables II and III.
We can see from Table V that the speculative premium is higher in periods
with δ closer to 0, with a few exceptions. This overall pattern is consistent with
TABLE V
SPECULATIVE PREMIUM BY INFORMATION REVEALED
δ q= 59 (N) q = 69 (N)
−7 −718 (6)
−6 −585 (4) −892 (8)
−5 368 (4) −1065 (2)
−4 500 (24) −070 (12)
−3 334 (52) 109 (30)
−2 473 (113) 181 (57)
−1 563 (182) 1045 (80)
0 (initial period) 375 (136) 813 (110)
0 875 (148) 1250 (98)
1 259 (138) 361 (146)
2 027 (58) 111 (88)
3 −016 (24) 0028 (53)
4 781 (35) 097 (39)
5 617 (7) 178 (5)
6 −034 (8)
7 015 (2)
8 039 (1)
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Proposition 1(i): speculative overpricing should be reflected in a positive specu-
lative premium in periods where α< 5 and β< 5 since there are no permanent
optimists. The median speculative premium for these periods is 5.00 in the
q = 59 treatment, 3.38 in the q = 69 treatment, and 5.00 overall, all significantly
positive (Wilcoxon signed-rank test: p < 005). The speculative premiums are
also significantly positive across all trading periods (Wilcoxon signed-rank test:
p < 005) in the q = 59 treatment (median: 4.80), in the q = 69 treatment (me-
dian: 1.89), and pooled across both treatments (median: 3.75).
RESULT 3—Proposition 1(i): The speculative premium is significantly posi-
tive in periods with no permanent optimist.
The second part of Proposition 1 states that the speculative premium should
be zero when enough Good News signals (or Bad News signals) have accumu-
lated relative to the number of periods remaining in the market (T − t ≤ |δ|).
We first test a weak form of this hypothesis, that is, the speculative premium
should be higher when T − t > |δ| than in periods where the horizon is too
short (T − t ≤ |δ|). Indeed, this is what we observe: the speculative premiums
are higher, on average, in periods where both α and β are less than T2 = 5 (Ta-
ble VI), and this difference is significant in both treatments. Second, a some-
what stronger prediction is that the speculative premium should be positive
if and only if both α < 5 and β < 5. Across all periods where either α or β
is greater than T2 = 5 (T − t ≤ |δ|), the speculative premiums are only signifi-
cantly different from zero in the q = 59 treatment. The null hypothesis that the
speculative premiums are zero cannot be rejected for the q = 69 treatment or
when we pool across both information treatments. Thus, with the one excep-
tion of trading periods when T − t ≤ |δ| in the q = 59 treatment, we find strong
support for our hypothesis.
RESULT 4—Proposition 1(ii): The speculative premium is not significantly
different from zero in periods where either α or β is greater than T2 = 5 (T−t ≤
|δ|), with the exception of periods where T − t ≤ |δ| in the q = 59 treatment.
TABLE VI
MEDIAN SPECULATIVE PREMIUMSa
q= 59
†
q = 69
†
Pooled†
α≥ 5 or β≥ 5 3.19∗ 099 200
α< 5 and β< 5 5.00∗ 338∗ 500∗
a ∗ = significantly different from 0 (p = 005). † = significantly
lower in periods with α≥ 5 or β≥ 5 (p= 005).
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5.1.3. Asymmetric Pricing in Good News versus Bad News Regimes
The asymmetric price response to information in good news regimes com-
pared to bad news regimes is already evident in Table II and Figure 1. The
median price never goes below 30 for information flows in bad news regimes
(δ < 0), while the price reaches above 90 in good news regimes (δ≥ 0).
The intuition behind our pricing asymmetry hypothesis (Proposition 2) is
that the marginal trader is a high-θ type in good news regimes and a low-θ type
in bad news regimes. Thus, prices react more strongly in good news regimes
(δ positive) than in bad news regimes (δ negative). If traders had homoge-
neous beliefs, even if the common θ were not 1, the prices would be above the
Bayesian benchmark only in good news regimes (if θ > 1) or only in bad news
regimes (if θ < 1), but not in both.
To test Proposition 2 more carefully, we run regressions to test if the price is
indeed less sensitive to bad news than to good news. The dependent variable
is the deviation of the median price from 50 in each period. This is calculated
by subtracting the price from 50 if δ < 0 and subtracting 50 from the price if
δ≥ 0.18 The independent variables are interaction terms, one between the ab-
solute difference between a signals and b signals, |δ|, and a dummy for this
difference being negative, and another between the difference and a dummy
for a nonnegative difference. We run the regression separately for each treat-
ment and again with the treatments pooled:
|50 − P| = π + γ1|δ| ∗ I(δ≥ 0)+ γ2|δ| ∗ I(δ < 0)+ 
We hypothesize that 0 ≤ γ2 < γ1 because, from Proposition 2, the price
should be further from 50 if δ ≥ 0 than if δ < 0. Table VII reports the re-
gression results.
We find that γ2 is significantly less than γ1 in both the separate and pooled re-
gressions as hypothesized (p< 005). When there are already at least as many
a signals as b signals (δ ≥ 0), the estimated price reaction to an additional a
signal (γ̂1) ranges from 7.35 to 9.40, and is significantly greater than zero in all
TABLE VII
PRICE REACTION TO GOOD NEWS VERSUS BAD NEWSa
5/9∗∗ 6/9∗ Pooled∗∗
γ1 735 (074) 840 (102) 9.40 (056)
γ2 −253 (129) 545 (118) 1.93 (061)
Constant 310 (108) 1166 (219) 5.85 (103)
aγ1 > γ2 (∗ : p= 005; ∗∗ : p= 001). Clustering by market.
18We run the same regressions with the absolute deviation from 50 as the dependent variable
and the qualitative results remain the same.
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cases (p< 001). In contrast, if there are already fewer a signals than b signals
(δ < 0), the estimated price reaction to an additional b signal (γ̂2) is not sig-
nificantly different from zero in the q = 59 treatment and is significantly greater
than 0 for the q = 69 treatment and for the pooled sample. We also note that
the constant is significantly greater than 0 in all the regressions, which indicates
speculative overpricing when δ= 0.
Finally, we test one additional implication of the asymmetric response hy-
pothesis: we compare the absolute price change when δ increases from 1 to 2
versus when δ decreases from −1 to −2.19 Pooled across both treatments, the
absolute price change when δ changes from 1 to 2 is 8.38 on average (N = 27).
This is significantly higher than the absolute price change when δ changes from
−1 to −2, which is 5.54 on average (N = 31; Mann–Whitney: p< 005).
RESULT 5—Proposition 2: Market prices react asymmetrically to informa-
tion in good and bad news regimes, and this asymmetry is consistent with the
equilibrium price dynamics predicted by the heterogeneous θ updating model.
5.1.4. The Horizon Effect
The horizon effect posits that the speculative premium is larger when there
are more periods remaining in the market, provided there is not yet a perma-
nent optimist. Formally, when T − t > |δ| (i.e., for our markets, if α < 5 and
β < 5), the speculative premium is weakly increasing in T − t for any fixed
value of δ.
To test Proposition 3, we first construct a horizon measure, which we specify
as the number of trading periods that remain in the market; thus, it ranges from
10 for the initial period to 0 for the last period. For each treatment, we regress
the estimated speculative premium on the horizon variable, controlling for the
difference in the pieces of good versus bad news, δ. We report the results sep-
arately for δ ≤ 0 and δ ≥ 0, because of the asymmetry of prices depending on
whether δ is greater or less than zero. These regressions were restricted to the
periods where α < 5 and β < 5 because our theory only predicts the horizon
effect for these periods. The regression coefficients are reported in Table VIII.
According to Proposition 3, the coefficient on T − t in the regression should
be greater than or equal to zero. We find that three of the four coefficients
on the horizon variable are not significantly different from zero, and the one
significant coefficient has the opposite sign, as predicted by Proposition 3. The
coefficients on |δ| are all significant and negative, indicating that the specula-
tive premium is smaller the further the posterior belief is from 0.5. This seems
intuitive, since the speculative premium arises because of the possibility that
the identity of the most optimistic trader may switch at some future date. The
19There are too few observations to compare δ = 2 to δ = 3 and δ = −2 to δ = −3 (or higher
levels of δ).
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TABLE VIII
THE HORIZON EFFECT IN SPECULATIVE PREMIUMS FOR PERIODS
WHERE δ≥ 0, α< 5, AND β< 5a
δ≥ 0 δ≤ 0
q = 59 q = 69 q = 59 q = 69
T − t −045 (023) −122∗ (051) −042 (033) −0066 (118)
|δ| −406∗∗ (058) −513∗∗ (144) −147∗ (067) −500∗ (211)
Constant 1054∗∗ (198) 1860∗∗ (565) 999∗∗ (283) 1675 (1231)
N 84 96 108 82
aSignificantly different from 0 (∗ : p< 005; ∗∗ : p< 001). Clustering by market.
probability of such a switch is decreasing in δ if δ > 0 and increasing in δ if
δ < 0. Furthermore, the switch, if it occurs, would happen closer to the hori-
zon the larger is |δ|, controlling for T − t.
RESULT 6—Proposition 3: We find no significant horizon effect, except in
one case where the speculative premium is significantly increasing in t.
5.2. Complete Markets and Relaxing the Short-Sale Constraint
5.2.1. Complete Markets: Both Assets Traded
We compare the price trajectories in the two markets in the complete mar-
kets environment to those in the incomplete market environment where only
one asset is traded. The prices in the complete markets do reach substan-
tially lower levels, in the 20s and 30s when δ < 0, which happens rarely in
the one-asset sessions. This suggests that having both assets available to trade
has allowed for some degree of incomplete arbitrage against the speculation.
However, we still observe prices significantly above 50 (Wilcoxon signed-rank:
p< 00001) in periods where δ= 0, a median price of 57 for Asset A and 59 for
Asset B. Furthermore, these above-value (Wilcoxon signed-rank: p = 00002)
median prices are also observed in the initial periods when no information has
been revealed in both markets, 56 for Asset A and 57 for Asset B.
Observing prices in complete markets provides an opportunity for an espe-
cially simple test of the overpricing hypothesis, by comparing the sum of the
two assets’ prices to 100 in any trading period. Proposition 2 implies that the
sum should be greater than the no-arbitrage price of 100 if α < 5 and β < 5.
The alternative hypothesis, based on arbitrage pricing, is that the sum of the
two prices should not be significantly different from 100.
It is evident from Table IX that, in nearly all cases (19 out of 23), the two
asset prices sum to greater than 100. In the q = 59 market, it occurs in all 10
cases. The effect is somewhat muted in the q = 69 treatment, where we observe
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TABLE IX
SUM OF MEDIAN PRICES IN COMPLETE
MARKETS SESSIONSa
δ q= 59 (N) q = 69 (N)
−6 100 (16)
−5 79 (27)
−4 99 (35)
−3 136 (8) 115 (36)
−2 132 (26) 120 (35)
−1 128 (34) 91 (48)
0 (initial period) 129 (73) 104 (65)
0 132 (46) 106 (38)
1 132 (77) 108 (24)
2 124 (72) 108 (15)
3 129 (43) 115 (6)
4 130 (11) 110 (6)
5 132 (5)
6 101 (2)
aN = number of transactions.
prices in excess of the no-arbitrage price in 9 of 13 cases. Of possible interest
is the observation that all of the exceptions arise when δ < 0 and q = 69 . Also
worth noting is the fact that the sum of the prices sometimes exceeds 100 by
a large amount. In fact, the sum of the prices is 15% or more above the no-
arbitrage prices more than half of the time (13 out of 23 cases). The sum of
prices is significantly greater than 100 in each treatment and pooled across
both treatments (p< 00001 for q = 59 treatments and both treatments pooled;
p= 00226 for q = 69 ).
RESULT 7 —Complete Markets: Prices in the two-asset markets are system-
atically higher than no-arbitrage prices. That is, the sum of the prices across
the two markets is greater than 100 for nearly all values of δ This is observed
for both treatments.
5.2.2. Relaxing the Short-Sale Constraint
Table X presents the aggregate prices for each value of δ for the three ses-
sions in which the short-sale constraint was relaxed, as well as the predicted
prices for the homogeneous Bayesian updating model. For 5 out of the 11 val-
ues of δ, the median price is actually below the Bayesian price.
Figure 4 shows the disparity between the prices in the sessions with and with-
out the option of buying and selling asset bundles. The median prices in the
sessions with a relaxed short-sale constraint are significantly lower than the
baseline markets (Mann–Whitney: p = 00037). In fact, the median price is
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TABLE X
MEDIAN PRICES IN MARKETS WITH SHORT SALESa
δ Median Price (N) Bayesian Price (θ= 1)
−6 1425 (42) 208
−5 2275 (60) 247
−4 34 (56) 291
−3 445 (121) 339
−2 4175 (181) 39
−1 49 (235) 444
0 (initial period) 515 (213) 50
0 52 (302) 50
1 55 (310) 556
2 65 (191) 61
3 64 (82) 661
4 70 (70) 709
aN = number of transactions.
lower for every value of δ except for δ = 3. Allowing short sales substantially
reduces speculative overpricing.20
FIGURE 4.—Median prices in short-sales sessions versus Bayesian predictions and markets
with no short sales.
20Even though the median prices in these sessions are very close to the Bayesian prices, statis-
tically they are still slightly higher (Wilcoxon signed-rank: p< 00001).
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RESULT 8—Short Sales: Allowing short sales significantly reduces the level
of overpricing. Prices are only slightly higher than Bayesian prices.
5.3. Asset Allocations
In addition to properties of equilibrium asset prices, our model also suggests
some hypotheses about the dynamics of asset ownership among the traders
as a function of the information revealed. We use individual trading data to
classify subjects into types based on how their individual holdings vary with δ.
One implication of our model for ownership dynamics is that different traders
hold the assets over time depending on the pieces of information revealed up
to that point. Specifically, when more signals of good news than bad news have
been revealed (δ > 0), the θmax traders are the optimists and should be net
buyers of the asset, while everyone else should sell the asset. On the other hand,
when more signals of bad news than good news have been revealed (δ < 0), the
θmin traders are the optimists and should hold the asset. To investigate these
predicted switches, we compare the distribution of asset holdings across traders
in periods where δ > 0 to the holdings distribution in periods where δ < 0.
We categorize each trader into one of behavioral types based on whether
his/her net holdings (end-of-period holdings minus initial endowment) is pos-
itive or negative. For each trader, we do this separately for δ > 0 periods and
δ < 0 periods.21 For each of these two ranges of δ, a trader is counted as hav-
ing zero net holdings if a trader’s mean net holdings are less than the standard
error of that trader’s net holdings over that range of δ. Otherwise the trader
is counted as having either positive or negative net holdings over that range
of δ. Traders with positive net holdings when δ > 0 and negative or zero net
holdings when δ < 0, or zero net holdings when δ > 0 and negative net hold-
ings when δ < 0, are categorized as Gullible or θmax types because they are net
buyers only when there is more good news than bad news. Traders with positive
holdings when δ < 0 and negative or zero net holdings when δ > 0, or zero net
holdings when δ < 0 and negative net holdings when δ > 0, are categorized as
Skeptical or θmin types because they are net buyers only when there is more bad
news than good news. Always Sell types have negative or zero net holdings in
both δ > 0 and δ < 0 periods, and these correspond in the model to traders
with intermediate values of θ, with θmin < θ< θmax.
Table XI summarizes the distribution of trader types across treatments. The
vast majority of traders (824%) in our markets are categorized as Gullible,
Skeptical, or Always Sell types, which is consistent with the heterogeneous be-
liefs model. There is a small residual category of traders who do not fall in
either of these three categories, and we refer to them as Noise Traders. These
few traders, who have nonnegative and sometimes positive net holdings for
both ranges of δ, are difficult to reconcile with the existing model.
21Periods where δ= 0 are not included in the analysis because the model makes no prediction
about asset holdings in these periods.
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TABLE XI
DISTRIBUTION OF TRADER TYPES
Treatment Always Sell Gullible Skeptical Always Buy Overall
5/9 10 9 10 5 34
6/9 10 8 9 7 34
Total 20 17 19 12 68
RESULT 9 —Trader Types: Most traders are classified in one of the three
categories: fickle, skeptical, and always sell, corresponding to high, low, and
intermediate values of θ, respectively.
6. CONCLUSION
We study pricing in asset markets with public information flows and the
short-sale constraint when traders have heterogeneous beliefs. We analyze a
simple parsimonious model of such heterogeneity with a single parameter that
indexes whether a trader overweights or underweights new information rela-
tive to Bayesian updating. Building on Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Morris
(1996), this model generates equilibrium price dynamics that exhibit two key
properties: speculative overpricing and asymmetric response to good and bad
news.
We report data from a series of laboratory markets for an asset whose termi-
nal payoff is contingent upon an unknown state of the world. At regular inter-
vals during the trading, a sequence of ten informative but imperfect signals are
publicly revealed to the traders at regular intervals. We find asset prices con-
sistently above what would be predicted by a model of homogeneous Bayesian
updating to a common posterior. Theoretically, an important component of
these high prices is speculative overpricing, which takes the form of a specu-
lative premium equal to the difference between the equilibrium price and the
maximum hold-to-maturity valuation among all traders. Traders are willing to
pay more for the asset than its “true” valuation as long as there is a positive
probability that some other trader may value it even more after some future
sequence of signals.
We also document an asymmetric price response to information in good
news versus bad news regimes, in that prices respond more strongly to infor-
mation when good news has outweighed bad news. This arises in the model
as a direct consequence of belief heterogeneity, because low-θ type traders
who update too conservatively have the most optimistic valuation in bad news
regimes; this valuation then determines the price, thus dampening the effect of
information. The high-θ types, who over-react to public information, have the
highest valuation when there has been more good news than bad news; thus
prices reflect this over-reaction.
1970 T. R. PALFREY AND S. W. WANG
To measure the speculative component of overpricing and to test explicitly
for the presence of belief heterogeneity, we estimate the maximum and min-
imum value of θ in each session, and find significant heterogeneity of beliefs
in all but one of the baseline sessions. The estimated distribution of θ types
implies a quantitative measure of the speculative premium in each period of
each market. We find that the estimated speculative premium is significantly
positive in periods with no permanent optimist, as predicted. In contrast, the
estimated speculative premium is significantly lower when there is a permanent
optimist, and is usually not significantly different from zero.
Next, we ask whether the speculative overpricing can be curbed institution-
ally. To answer this question, we ran additional sessions where we manipulated
the market organization in two different ways: (a) by instituting complete mar-
kets with the full set of two Arrow–Debreu securities being traded in parallel,
one market for asset A and one for asset B; and (b) by instituting a market
where short sales are allowed. In the complete markets environment, signif-
icant overpricing persists: the transaction prices of the two assets add up to
more than the certain payoff of holding one unit of each asset, 100. Just as in
the one-market sessions, we observe prices that are significantly higher than
50 in the initial periods when no information has been revealed, as well as in
periods where the number of good news signals equals the number of bad news
signals.
In contrast, when the short-sale constraint is removed, prices are significantly
reduced and are close to the Bayesian benchmark. Overall, our results demon-
strate that the short-sale constraint can be an important factor leading to spec-
ulative overpricing in asset markets, which may have implications for policies
that explicitly limit the extent to which traders may engage in short selling.
Finally, the model also generates predictions about patterns of asset own-
ership that depend on the sequence of public signals. To study the predictions
about individual asset ownership, we categorize traders into several categories
depending on whether their trading behavior is consistent with being a high
θ-type (net buyer with good news, net seller with bad news), a low-θ type
(net buyer with bad news, net seller with good news), or an intermediate-θ
type (net seller). Most traders’ net holdings patterns are consistent with the
heterogeneous-θ model, with two caveats: most traders do not reduce their
holdings to exactly zero when they are net sellers; and a few traders average
positive net holdings in both good news regimes and bad news regimes.
We conclude that the heterogeneous beliefs model of asset pricing is broadly
supported by our data. Methodologically, the “public information flow” asset
market design used here is an innovation to laboratory markets that makes
it possible to address important theoretical questions about asset pricing dy-
namics. There are a variety of different directions to take this work and our
findings are suggestive of some interesting theoretical and experimental ex-
tensions. On the theoretical side, one could enrich the type space by consid-
ering multidimensional time-dependent types where θit varies over time. One
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could also consider alternative specifications of belief heterogeneity. It would
be useful to extend both the Morris model and our model to include risk-averse
traders or to incorporate private information. In principle, one would expect
the qualitative properties of the dynamic trajectory of asset prices (speculative
premium, asymmetry, and horizon effects) to continue to hold in these more
general models, but the holdings predictions would not be as extreme. How-
ever, until these difficult theoretical problems are resolved, we leave this as a
conjecture.
APPENDIX: PROOFS
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: The posterior belief that  = A for traders of
type θ, given a sequence of good and bad news announcements (αβ= t − α),
is
ραit(θ)=
qαθ(1 − q)βθ
qαθ(1 − q)βθ + qβθ(1 − q)αθ 
Since q > 05,
θmax = arg max
i∈I
{
ραit(θi)
}
if δ > 0
and
θmin = arg max
i∈I
{
ραit(θi)
}
if δ < 0
Traders with the highest θ place the greatest weight on signals, so their poste-
rior for state A will be highest of all traders when α > β. On the other hand,
traders with the lowest θ underweight the signals the most, so their posterior
for state A will be highest of the traders when β > α. When α − β = δ = 0,
then ρit(α)= p= 05 ∀i, that is, all traders’ beliefs coincide, and every trader is
a current optimist.
To prove (i), consider period t and any sequence such that |δ| + t < T . Thus,
if all future signals are a-signals (i.e., st+1 = · · · = sT = a), then the current op-
timist at period T is a θmax trader. Similarly, if all future signals are b-signals
(i.e., st+1 = · · · = sT = b), then the current optimist at period T is a θmin trader.
Therefore, there is no permanent optimist at period t. That is, there is no per-
manent optimist at t if and only if it is uncertain which trader type will be the
current optimist in the final period, T .
To complete the proof, we need to show that the speculative premium is
positive. Suppose, without loss of generality, that in period t there has been a
sequence of signals {s1     st} with 0 ≤ δ < T − t, so a θmax trader is a current
optimist. (The argument is the same for the case of 0 ≤ −δ < T − t and θmin is
a current optimist.) Let t ′ = t+1+α−β. Note that t ′ ≤ T since α−β+ t < T .
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Consider all sequences of signals st′t = {st+1     st′ }. For exactly one such se-
quence, st′t = (b     b), the sequence with all b signals, a θmax trader is not a
current optimist at t ′. (Instead, a θmin trader will be the current optimist.) The
equilibrium price following this sequence is just Pt′(α). Because θmax is not a
current optimist at t ′ for this sequence, it implies that Pt′(α) > ραt′(θmax). For
all other sequences st′t = (b     b), a θmax trader is still a current optimist at t ′.
Let z(st′t ) denote the θmax trader’s belief at t that the exact sequence of signals
from period t + 1 to period t ′ will be st′t , and denote by α˜(st′t ) the total num-
ber of a signals out of all signals s1     st′ , given that α of the first t signals
were a signals. Thus, the θmax trader’s belief at t ′ that the state of the world
is A equals ρα˜(s
t′
t )
t′ (θmax). Because θmax is a current optimist at t
′, it implies that
Pt′ (˜α(s
t′
t ))≥ ρα˜(s
t′
t )
t′ (θmax) for all s
t′
t = (b     b). However, by the recursive def-
inition of prices, and because θmax is a current optimist for every period from t
to t ′ − 1 (since we constructed t ′ = t + 1 + α−β), the current price is given by
Pt(α) = z(b     b)Pt′(α)+
∑
st
′
t =(bb)
z
(
st
′
t
)
Pt′
(˜
α
(
st
′
t
))
≥ z(b     b)Pt′(α)+
∑
st
′
t =(bb)
z
(
st
′
t
)
ρ
α˜(st
′
t )
t′ (θmax)
> z(b     b)ραt′(θmax)+
∑
st
′
t =(bb)
z
(
st
′
t
)
ρ
α˜(st
′
t )
t′ (θmax)
= ραt (θmax)
The last line follows from the fact that, given the updating formulas, ραt (θmax)=∑
st
′
t
z(st
′
t )ρ
α˜(st
′
t )
t′ (θmax). Hence Pt(α) > ρ
α
t (θmax), and there is a positive specula-
tive premium when there is no permanent optimist.
We now move to the proof of (ii). If, at some t, we have α−β≥ T − t, then
α ≥ β and hence ραt (θmax) ≥ ραit(θi) ∀i. Furthermore, for all t ′ = t + 1     T
and all possible sequences of signals {st+1     st′ }, α ≥ t ′ − T2 ≥ t ′ − α = β,
θmax will be the current optimist: ρ
θmax
t′ (α) ≥ ρit′(α) ∀i. Thus a θmax trader is
a permanent optimist at t following any sequence of signals {s1     st} such
that |s ∈ {s1     st}|s = a}| = α ≥ T2 . By a similar argument, a θmin trader is a
permanent optimist at t following any sequence of signals {s1     st} such that
|s ∈ {s1     st}|s = b}| ≥ T2 .
To complete the proof of (ii), let τ index the number of periods left until
the end of the market. We prove by induction on τ that if θmax is a permanent
optimist at t, then, for all possible continuation sequences of signals up to pe-
riod T − τ (i.e., for all α′ = αα + 1    α + T − t − τ), Pτ(α′) = ρα′τ (θmax),
τ = 0     T − t. First, note that this is trivially true for τ = 0, since this means
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t = T , and so it is the last period The last period price is given by PT(α′) =
ρT(α
′)= ρα′T (θmax). The last holds because θmax is a permanent optimist at t and
α′ ≥ α ≥ T2 . Next we show that, if 0 < τ < T − t and PT−τ(α′) = ρα
′
T−τ(θmax) for
all α′ = αα+1    α+T − t−τ, then PT−(τ+1)(α′)= ρα′T−(τ+1)(θmax) for all α′ =
αα+1    α+T − t−(τ+1). Fix some α′ ∈ {αα+1    α+T − t−(τ+1)}.
By definition, in period T − (τ + 1) the equilibrium price is
PT−(τ+1)
(
α′
)= ϕT−(τ+1)(α′)PT−τ(α′ + 1)+ (1 −ϕT−(τ+1)(α′))PT−τ(α′)
= ϕT−(τ+1)
(
α′
)
ρα
′+1
T−τ (θmax)+
(
1 −ϕT−(τ+1)
(
α′
))
ρα
′
T−τ(θmax)
= ρα′T−(τ+1)(θmax) Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: As before, let τ index the number of periods
left until the end of the market. We again prove the result by induction on τ.
First, we show the proposition is true for τ = 0 and τ = 1. Note that since
α > t2 , ρ
∗
t (α) = ρθmaxt (α) because δ > 0. Similarly, ρ∗t (t − α) = ρθmint (t − α) >
ρθmaxt (t − α). Since ρθmaxt (α) + ρθmaxt (t − α) = 1, ρθmint (t − α) > 1 − ρθmaxt (α). If
τ = 0 or 1, t ≥ T − 1. Thus, α > t2 implies α ≥ T2 . By Proposition 1, if α ≥ T2 ,
then Pt(α)= ρ∗t (α) and Pt(t − α)= ρ∗t (t − α). Therefore
Pt(t − α) = ρθmint (t − α)
>
(
1 − ρθmaxt (α)
)= (1 − Pt(α))
Note that, given the definition of τ, if τ corresponds to T − t then τ + 1
corresponds to T − t − 1. To complete the proof, letting t = T − τ we show
that, for any T − 2 > τ > 1 and for all t > α > t2 , 1 − Pt(α) < Pt(t − α) implies
1 − Pt−1(α) < Pt−1(t − 1 − α) By the equilibrium pricing equation,
Pt−1(α) = ϕt−1(α)Pt(α+ 1)+
(
1 −ϕt−1(α)
)
Pt(α)
= ϕθmaxt−1 (α)Pt(α+ 1)+
(
1 −ϕθmaxt−1 (α)
)
Pt(α)
The second line follows because δ > 0. The equilibrium pricing equation after
a sequence with equal number of signals (t − 1) but the numbers for the pieces
of good news and bad news reversed is
Pt−1(t − 1 − α) = ϕt−1(t − 1 − α)Pt(t − α)
+ (1 −ϕt−1(t − 1 − α))Pt(t − 1 − α)
= ϕθmint−1 (t − 1 − α)Pt(t − α)
+ (1 −ϕθmint−1 (t − 1 − α))Pt(t − 1 − α)
The second line is due to the fact that t − 1 −α < t2 , so the number of a signals
is less than the number of b signals.
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Because the proposition is assumed to be true for τ = T − t we have 1 −
Pt(α+ 1) < Pt(t − (α+ 1))= Pt(t − 1 − α) and 1 − Pt(α) < Pt(t − α). Thus
1 − Pt−1(α) = ϕθmaxt−1 (α)
[
1 − Pt(α+ 1)
]
+ (1 −ϕθmaxt−1 (α))[1 − Pt(α)]
< ϕθmaxt−1 (α)Pτ(t − 1 − α)+
(
1 −ϕθmaxt−1 (α)
)
Pt(t − α)
<
(
1 −ϕθmint−1 (t − 1 − α)
)
Pτ(t − 1 − α)
+ϕθmint−1 (t − 1 − α)Pt(t − α)
= Pt−1(t − 1 − α)
because Pτ(t−1−α) < Pt(t−α) and ϕθmaxt−1 (α) > 1−ϕθmint−1 (t−1−α), the latter
following from θmax > θmin Q.E.D.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: Again τ indexes the number of periods left until
the end of the market. We prove by induction that πT−τ(α)−πT−τ−2(α−1)≤ 0
for all τ = 0     T − 2 and for all α= 1    T − τ − 1.
We first show that this is true for τ = 0. By Proposition 1, πτ=0(α)= πT(α)=
0 and πT−τ−2(α−1)= πT−2(α−1)≥ 0. Thus πT−τ(α)−πT−τ−2(α−1)≥ 0 when
τ = 0.
Note that, given the definition of τ, if τ corresponds to t then τ + 1 corre-
sponds to t − 1. To complete the proof, letting t = T − τ > 2, we need to show
that if πt(α) ≤ πt−2(α− 1) for all α = 1     t − 1, then πt−1(α) ≤ πt−3(α− 1)
for all α= 1     t − 2. To prove this, pick any α ∈ {1     t − 2}. We have
πt−1(α) = ϕ∗t−1(α)
[
πt(α+ 1)+ ρ∗t (α+ 1)
]
+ (1 −ϕ∗t−1(α))[πt(α)+ ρ∗t (α)]− ρ∗t−1(α)
= πt(α)+ ρ∗t (α)− ρ∗t−1(α)
+ϕ∗t−1(α)
[
πt(α+ 1)−πt(α)+ ρ∗t (α+ 1)− ρ∗t (α)
]

while the speculative premium for a sequence with the same δ but two more
periods left before the end of the market, πt−3(α− 1), is
πt−3(α− 1) = ϕ∗t−3(α− 1)
[
πt−2(α)+ ρ∗t−2(α)
]− ρ∗t−3(α− 1)
+ (1 −ϕ∗t−3(α− 1))[πt−2(α− 1)+ ρ∗t−2(α− 1)]
= πt−2(α− 1)+ ρ∗t−2(α− 1)− ρ∗t−3(α− 1)
+ϕ∗t−3(α− 1)
× [πt−2(α)−πt−2(α− 1)+ ρ∗t−2(α)− ρ∗t−2(α− 1)]
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We now calculate the difference between these two speculative premiums,
πt−3(α− 1)−πt−1(α). A number of terms cancel out in this difference because
ρ∗t (α)= ρ∗t−2(α− 1), ρ∗t−1(α)= ρ∗t−3(α− 1), ρ∗t (α+ 1)= ρ∗t−2(α), and ϕ∗t−1(α)=
ϕ∗t−3(α− 1)= ϕ˜∗ ∈ (01). Thus we are left with
πt−3(α− 1)−πt−1(α) =
(
1 − ϕ˜∗)(πt−2(α− 1)−πt(α))
+ ϕ˜∗(πt−2(α)−πt(α+ 1))
We know that πt−2(α− 1)− πt(α) ≥ 0 and πt−2(α)− πt(α+ 1) ≥ 0 by the in-
duction hypothesis. Therefore, since ϕ˜∗ ∈ (01), we get πt−3(α− 2)−πt−1(α−
1)≥ 0. Q.E.D.
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